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The first sale doctrine decouples intellectual property and physical
property. Suppose, at an auction at Sotheby’s, someone bought a
contemporary painting by Chuck Close.1 The buyer now owns the
physical painting, but the copyright to the painting remains with the
owner of the copyright—the painter Chuck Close or whomever Close
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V7.I3.1
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** Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
1. See Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (analyzing
whether first sale doctrine in federal copyright law preempted California’s Resale
Royalty Act).
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may have transferred the copyright to.2 Absent the first sale doctrine,
if the buyer either sold the painting or displayed it to the public, the
buyer would potentially infringe the copyright in the painting.3 The
copyright owner has the exclusive right to display copies (including
the original, the first copy4) of the painting to the public and to
distribute copies to the public.5 However, the first sale doctrine
provides that the owner of an authorized copy may display or
distribute that particular copy without infringing.6 The distribution
right and display right no longer apply; these rights are “exhausted.”7
Permission from the copyright owner is not required to resell
copyrighted works or to display them.8 First sale permits a broad
swath of activity. Used bookstores, libraries, swap fests, eBay,
students reselling casebooks, and many more may rely on first sale to
protect their distribution of copyrighted works.9 Museums, galleries,
archives, bookstores, and more can likewise display their copies of
copyrighted works without infringing under first sale. First sale (more
commonly called “exhaustion” in patent law10) also applies to
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including
the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any
rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under
a copyright convey property rights in any material object.”).
3. “Potentially” because there exists the possibility of fair use. See id. § 107.
4. Id. § 101 (“The term ‘copies’ includes the material object, other than a
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”).
5. See id. § 106(3) (“to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”);
id. § 106(5) (“to display the copyrighted work publicly”).
6. See id. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); see also
§ 109(c) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular
copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly,
either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers
present at the place where the copy is located.”).
7. See, e.g., SHUBHA GHOSH & IRENE CALBOLI, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE LAW AND POLICY ANALYSIS 6–7 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013)
(applying first sale to copies made abroad).
9. “Without the exhaustion doctrine, the market for reselling or renting products
would either not exist or would look very different.” GHOSH & CALBOLI, supra note
7, at 6.
10. See, e.g., Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent
Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 484 (2010) (“The patent exhaustion
doctrine, also known as the first sale doctrine, evolved in the United States during the
late nineteenth century to accommodate the free movement of patented goods in
commerce. In its simplest statement, the doctrine operates to ‘exhaust,’ or extinguish,
the exclusive rights of sale and use as to patented articles sold with the patent owner’s
authorization.”).
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patented products.11 Someone who buys a patented product (such as a
pharmaceutical, computing device, or printer cartridge) can use or
resell that product without infringing the patent, even though the
patent owner has the rights to exclude others from using or selling the
invention.12 First sale enables markets for resale or lease of patent
products, from printer cartridges to airplanes.
First sale has its limits. In copyright, it applies only to the rights to
distribute and to display the work.13 The copyright owner also has the
exclusive right to make copies, to adapt the work, and to perform the
work publicly, which are not subject to first sale.14 The painting buyer
would potentially infringe if the buyer made a copy of the painting15
or adapted it into another artwork,16 but the buyer could not infringe
the performance right, because one cannot perform a painting.17 The
owner of a copy of a musical work may infringe if she performs it in
public, which is why bars need licenses to play copyrighted music,
even using copies they have purchased. The owner of a copy of a
movie may infringe if she adapted the movie, such as making a
sequel—or even dubbing the movie in another language. In patent,
first sale likewise would not authorize the purchaser of a product to
make additional copies. Similarly, first sale in patent would authorize
the buyer of a patented item to use it or resell it, but not to make
another one.18
First sale is long-established, by statute in copyright and by judicial
interpretation in patent. The underlying policy of first sale, however,
has been unsettled.19 First sale can be seen to rest on either of two
rationales.20 The first is a contract-based, gap-filler approach. If
11. First sale applies also within trademark law but triggers significantly different
policy concerns. See David W. Barnes, Free-Riders and Trademark Law’s First Sale
Rule, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 457, 458 (2011) (“The co-
incidence of consumers’ and trademark owners’ interests may provide legitimate
grounds for distinguishing trademark first sale doctrine from copyright and patent
first sale doctrine.”).
12. See, e.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1531–36 (2017) (holding that first sale overrides contractual provisions and that first
sale in patent law applies to transactions abroad).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
14. Id. § 106(1)–(2), (4), (6).
15. Id. § 106(1).
16. Id. § 106(2).
17. Id. (giving the copyright holder the exclusive right “in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly . . . [P]ictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works” are not included in the performance right).
18. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 280 (2013).
19. Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints,
2014 BYU L. REV. 55, 141 (2014) (“Despite over a hundred years of adjudication,
courts have never been able to draw the exact contours of the first sale doctrine or
fully articulate its rationale.”).
20. First sale is also related to other doctrines that may be triggered by restraints
on resale. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The
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someone sells a painting, one would expect an implicit agreement that
the buyer could display the painting or resell it, as both actions are
customary with artworks. To simplify transactions, the rights to resell
and display are automatically included in the transaction. The other
justification is the policy against restraints on alienation, borrowed
from the law of real property. Someone who sells property may not
impose unreasonable restraints on the buyer’s ability to resell the
property.21 As transplanted to intellectual property law, once a party
voluntarily parts with a copy, she should no longer be able to control
what the buyer does with it. Hence, her rights are “exhausted” in that
particular copy. The underlying rationale is important for determining
the extent of the first sale doctrine. If first sale is a gap-filler, then the
parties could contract around it, agreeing that the property sold would
not be subject to first-sale rights.22 If first sale is a policy-based bar
against unreasonable restraints on alienation, then first sale is
mandatory—it is not subject to the agreement of the parties but rather
is the opposite: a limit on the enforceability of their agreement.
Both strains can be seen in the case law. Two recent Supreme Court
cases, however, decisively rested first sale on the restraints-against-
alienation rationale, expressly rejecting the proposition that parties
can contract around first sale. This Article explores the implications of
those cases for the boundaries of first sale, focusing on two issues.
First, California’s resale royalty law required that artists receive 5% of
the proceeds on resale of their work.23 The Ninth Circuit held that the
California statute was preempted by the first sale doctrine of federal
copyright law.24 We conclude that, if first sale serves to prevent
unreasonable restraints on alienation, such resale royalty statutes
should be valid. Rather than an unreasonable restraint on alienation,
they permit resale, imposing a modest burden for a purpose entirely
consonant with copyright law: rewarding authors. Second, software
sellers have long avoided first sale by characterizing software sales as
mere licenses, while formally retaining ownership of the software after
First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 511 (2011) (“As
they became more refined and technical, the developing doctrines of exhaustion,
antitrust, and misuse all addressed practices thought to be anticompetitive, such as
tying, but they also moved in different directions.”).
21. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 281 (5th ed. 2017) (“However,
the current approach emerging in the courts is to refuse to enforce restraints on
alienation if they are unreasonable”).
22. See, e.g., GHOSH & CALBOLI, supra note 7, at 19 (“Nonetheless, the answer
rests in part on the theory underlying the exhaustion doctrine. If exhaustion is
understood as an implied license, then express terms in a contract or other agreement
can defeat the exhaustion doctrine.”).
23. The statute was similar to laws in effect in such jurisdictions as France,
Germany, and Italy. See Marydale DeBor, Artists’ Residual Rights in the Tangible
Products of Creative Expression: A Survey of Legislation and an Analysis of the
Feasibility of Implementation in the United States, 2 J.L. & COM. 111, 130 (1982).
24. See Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018).
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delivery to the buyer.25 Courts have enforced transactions according
to the parties’ contract. We conclude, however, that such transactions,
which are intended to prevent resale of software, should be
characterized as sales in substance, triggering first-sale rights to resell
the software, overriding the contractual restraint on alienation.
I. FIRST SALE AS ROOTED IN THE POLICY AGAINST
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
The Supreme Court had left open the issue of the underlying policy
of first sale, whether first sale was a gap-filler in the contract of the
parties or rather a limit on how parties could allocate rights. The key
copyright case from 1908, Bobbs-Merrill, emphasized that “[t]here is
no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license agreement con-
trolling the subsequent sales of the book.”26 In 1941, in patent, the
Court simply stated first sale as self-evident:
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the
patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the
patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the
sale of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent
law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the
thing sold.27
The Court then took no patent first sale (also known as exhaustion)
cases for decades, leaving it to the lower courts to reckon with the
purposes of the doctrine.
A. Early Cases
The Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. held that
first sale applied to patents on methods as well as patents on prod-
ucts.28 The Court did not address, however, whether first-sale rights
could be limited by contract. Indeed, the Court did not provide gui-
dance as to the underlying policy goals of the first sale doctrine.29
Quanta was decided in 2008 and, as the Court noted, its first decision
25. See David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the
Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157 (1990) (discussing how
license agreements are used by software sellers to avoid the first sale doctrine).
26. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
27. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (citing Adams v.
Burke, 21 L.Ed. 700 (1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895);
Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)).
28. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628 (2008) (“Nothing
in this Court’s approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE’s argument that method
patents cannot be exhausted.”).
29. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 492 (“The Supreme Court missed an opportu-
nity to make the law of post-sale restraints more coherent in its recent Quanta Com-
puter decision, where it reverted to a strict application of the first sale rule not clearly
related to any policy of furthering competition or innovation.”).
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on patent exhaustion since 1942.30 In the absence of Supreme Court
guidance, lower courts held that contracts could effectively limit first
sale rights, such as by effectively prohibiting resale of the goods. The
leading case was Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., which held that
the seller of a patented medical device (an “an apparatus for delivery
of radioactive or therapeutic material in aerosol mist form to the lungs
of a patient”31) could effectively prohibit the resale of the devices.32
The Supreme Court took up first sale again in 2013, but once again
did not plumb the basis of the doctrine. The issue in Bowman v. Mon-
santo Co. was “whether a farmer who buys patented seeds may
reproduce them through planting and harvesting without the patent
holder’s permission.”33 In general terms, the case raised the extent of
patent exhaustion in self-replicating patented products, such as the
seeds in Bowman or some software inventions.34 The Bowman Court,
however, did not measure out the bounds of the judicially created pat-
ent exhaustion doctrine by fitting it to any underlying policy.35 Rather,
the Court took a more formal approach, deeming that first sale by
definition could only apply to the actual item sold, not future genera-
tions springing from that item.36 First sale in patent is a judicially cre-
ated doctrine with few Supreme Court cases, so it seems inapt to treat
it as a set rule to apply formalistically. The only policy consideration
given much weight was the slippery slope argument that if second gen-
eration seeds were subject to first-sale rights, then the first sale excep-
tion could swallow the entire bundle of exclusive rights.37 Thus,
Bowman passed on an opportunity to decide what the primary policy
of first sale was. If first sale serves to put into effect the agreement of
the parties, then it was a clear case: Monsanto sold the seeds subject to
prohibitions on reuse of second-generation seeds, and so the farmer
would infringe by buying and planting second-generation seeds. If first
30. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 627 (citing Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241).
31. Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abro-
gated by Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
32. Mallinckrodt Inc., 976 F.2d at 709.
33. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 280 (2013).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 284–85.
36. Id. (“Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides this case against him.
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans he
purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed
them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no business
interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does
not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s per-
mission (either express or implied).”).
37. Id. (“But in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product
and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its monopoly. And farmers
themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or
(as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then
multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed
without compensating its inventor.”).
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sale serves to protect against restraints on alienation, then the case
raised interesting issues about the extent of that policy. One could
argue that once patented seeds are sold, owners are free to use them
as they please, including selling the second generation of seeds, and
that buyers would therefore take them free of patent rights. The sec-
ond-generation seeds were lawfully made, and so would be subject to
first-sale rights, just as items made abroad are subject to first-sale
rights. Or one could argue that the rationale of opposing restraints on
alienation does not stretch so far—rather restraints on alienation ap-
ply only to the actual seeds sold and not to the offspring seeds. The
Court in Bowman steered clear of such debates, limiting its ruling to
what it characterized as a formal application of the doctrine to the
particular facts in front of it, reserving for future cases the general
boundaries of first sale.38
As noted above, the key case for first sale in copyright law was
1908’s Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.39 In that case, a publisher of The
Castaway, a novel, included a notice in each book directly after the
copyright notice: “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer
is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be
treated as an infringement of the copyright.”40 The Court held the
restriction was not binding on future purchasers of the book:
In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the
copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not cre-
ate the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a
limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future pur-
chasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.41
The copyright owner’s exclusive right to sell the book did not entitle it
to attach conditions to copies sold that would bind future owners of
copies.42 Rather, that first sale was all the exclusive right to vend cop-
ies included: “The owner of the copyright in this case did sell copies of
the book in quantities and at a price satisfactory to it. It has exercised
the right to vend.”43 The Court in Bobbs-Merrill did not search for an
underlying rationale for so limiting the exclusive rights of the copy-
right holder. Rather, it simply interpreted the right to sell under the
statute to be limited to the right to sell a copy once, not to control the
38. Id. at 289 (“Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us,
rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”).
39. See generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
40. Id. at 341.
41. Id. at 350.
42. Id. at 351 (“What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to
sell the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reservation of the
right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer because of the printed
notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the
notice.”).
43. Id.
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future sales of that copy.44 The Court also rested on the lack of privity,
leaving open the enforceability of such restrictions.45 The Court em-
phasized that the buyer had not agreed to any restrictions on further
sale, leaving open the issue as to whether the parties could effectively
limit the rights transferred: “It is not denied that one who has sold a
copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to
control the sale of it.”46 So the case left open whether first sale rested
on an implied agreement (which the parties could alter by contract) or
a prohibition against restraints on alienation (which would nullify such
restraints). As in patent, the Supreme Court took few copyright first-
sale cases in the following decades and did not consider the underlying
rationale for the doctrine.47
B. Recent First Sale Developments in the Supreme Court
1. The Kirtsaeng Decision
Awakening from its dogmatic slumbers, the Supreme Court more
recently took a more decisive approach. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, the Court held that the first sale doctrine authorized the impor-
tation of copyrighted works that were made abroad with the authori-
zation of the copyright owner.48 A student from Thailand, studying in
the United States, noted that similar textbooks were sold at much
lower prices in foreign markets.49 He engaged in arbitrage, importing
the books and reselling them in the United States.50 The publisher
contended that books manufactured outside the United States were
not subject to first sale, as they had not been lawfully made under the
copyright statute (which triggers first-sale rights), but instead were be-
yond the scope of the United States copyright law under the principle
of territoriality.51 The case triggered consideration of the relationship
among the copyright owner’s right of public distribution, including
44. Id. (“To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future
retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right
not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by
construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the
legislative intent in its enactment.”).
45. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 498 (“As the law stood in 1908, any post-
sale restraint on a patented or copyrighted article that was imposed by means of a
licensing restriction and enforced by an infringement action was unenforceable. How-
ever, the courts had not yet addressed the legality of restricted distribution agree-
ments under the Sherman Act.”).
46. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350.
47. The Court did consider restrictions on resale in the context of antitrust, as
vertical restraints. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 504 (“Most decisions that have
applied the rule have involved either tying arrangements or [resale price mainte-
nance], and the Court was typically not very subtle about noting that the first sale rule
and antitrust law pulled in tandem.”).
48. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013).
49. Id. at 527.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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rights of importation, and the first sale doctrine’s limitation on the
public distribution right.52 The Court resolved the conflict in favor of
first sale, holding that first sale was not limited to domestic sales or to
copies made in the United States.53
Unlike in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court in Kirtsaeng did not simply ad-
dress the matter by technically applying the statutory exclusive rights.
Rather, the Court traced back the link between first sale and re-
straints on alienation historically:
The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impecca-
ble historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained
the common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of
chattels.
[If] a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or of any other
chattel . . . and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein
upon condition that the Donee or Vendee shall not
alien[ate] the same, the [condition] is voi[d], because his
whole interest . . . is out of him, so as he hath no pos-
sibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against Trade and Traffi[c],
and bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man:
and it is within the reason of our Author that it should
ouster him of all power given to him.”54
Lord Coke’s “explanation,” as has been noted, is rather circular: re-
straints on alienation are void because they are void.55 The Court did
add some economic policy to the bare statement: “With these last few
words, Coke emphasizes the importance of leaving buyers of goods
free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise disposing
of those goods. American law too has generally thought that competi-
tion, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of the
consumer.”56 So the Court hinted that the rationale rested on prevent-
ing anti-competitive behavior, but did not spell out why freedom to
resell goods would necessarily promote competition, rather than, for
example, simply causing the seller to limit its sales. The decision, how-
52. Id. at 528.
53. Id. at 525.
54. Id. (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360 (1628));
see also Charles M. Gray, Two Contributions to Coke Studies, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1127, 1135 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1449, 1481 (2004) (“Coke’s locution (as well as his spelling) is archaic, yet, astound-
ingly, the circular style of reasoning can still be found in contemporary statements
that explain that restraints on alienability are ‘repugnant to the deed.’”).
56. Id. (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886
(2007)) (restraints with “manifestly anticompetitive effects” are per se illegal; others
are subject to the rule of reason) (internal citations omitted); 1 P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 4, ¶ 100 (3d ed. 2006) (“[T]he principal objective of
antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave
competitively.”).
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ever, rested first sale firmly on the policy against restraints on
alienation.57
The Kirtsaeng Court stated another reason that relied on the policy
against restraints on alienation: “The ‘first sale’ doctrine also frees
courts from the administrative burden of trying to enforce restrictions
upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods.”58 The Court also
placed weight on commercial practices now embedded in United
States culture that depend on first sale and on the absence of re-
straints on alienation: “Associations of libraries, used-book dealers,
technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums point
to various ways in which a geographical interpretation would fail to
further basic constitutional copyright objectives, in particular
‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”59 That sug-
gests a broader rationale than the promotion of competition.
2. The Lexmark Decision
The Supreme Court’s 2017 patent law decision in Impression Prod-
ucts v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. hewed to Kirtsaeng and made the policy of
restraints on alienation the central core of the first-sale doctrine in
patent law.60 In Lexmark, purchasers of printer cartridges agreed “to
use the cartridge only once and to refrain from transferring the car-
tridge to anyone but Lexmark.”61 The Court held that first sale cannot
be limited by contract. The clause notwithstanding, it would not be
patent infringement if there was further use or resale of the car-
tridge—although the provision might be enforceable between the par-
ties as a matter of contract law.62 Relying on Kirtsaeng, the Lexmark
Court also held that first sale applies to domestic and international
sales.63 More than just a default rule subject to change by the parties,
under Lexmark, first sale became a nonwaivable effect of a sale.64 Ac-
cordingly, any restrictions made in connection with the sale of a pat-
ented item may not be enforced through actions for patent
infringement (there being no more patent rights in the item sold), but
rather through contract alone.65 This is not merely a shift in the basis
57. Katz, supra note 19, at 123 (“The majority solved the problem by opting for
international exhaustion, emphasizing the common law (rather than statutory) origin
of the doctrine, and evincing strong commitment to the continuing relevance of the
common law’s hostility to restraints on alienation.”).
58. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539 (2013).
59. Id. at 540 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
60. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2017).
61. Id. at 1525.
62. Id. at 1526.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1529.
65. The court in Lexmark stated:
A patentee’s authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit
thought, mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restric-
tions on purchasers that are enforceable through the patent laws. So long as
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for enforcing rights. Because only contract rights survive, the patent
holder cannot enforce restrictions against parties using the item that
are not parties to the sale, such as subsequent buyers, due to the priv-
ity requirements of contract law.
Although applying patent law66 to first sale (more often called “ex-
haustion” in the patent context67), the Lexmark Court adopted the
rationale from Kirtsaeng and rested first sale on the policy against re-
straints on alienation:
This well-established exhaustion rule marks the point where patent
rights yield to the common law principle against restraints on alien-
ation. The Patent Act “promote[s] the progress of science and the
useful arts by granting to [inventors] a limited monopoly” that al-
lows them to “secure the financial rewards” for their inventions. But
once a patentee sells an item, it has “enjoyed all the rights secured”
by that limited monopoly. Because “the purpose of the patent law is
fulfilled . . . when the patentee has received his reward for the use of
his invention,” that law furnishes “no basis for restraining the use
and enjoyment of the thing sold.”68
a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in
effect, authorized the sale. That licensee’s sale is treated, for purposes of
patent exhaustion, as if the patentee made the sale itself. The result: the sale
exhausts the patentee’s rights in that item. A license may require the licen-
see to impose a restriction on purchasers, like the license limiting the com-
puter manufacturer to selling for non-commercial use by individuals. But if
the licensee does so—by, perhaps, having each customer sign a contract
promising not to use the computers in business—the sale nonetheless ex-
hausts all patent rights in the item sold. The purchasers might not comply
with the restriction, but the only recourse for the licensee is through contract
law, just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction.
Id. at 1534–35 (citations omitted).
66. Note that first sale applies also in trademark law, but the context involves a
different set of policy concerns. See Barnes, supra note 11, at 460 (“While creators and
users have a co-incident interest in providing creators financial incentives to produce
intellectual property, users of copyrighted expressions and patented inventions seek
free access to those creations after creation. This is not entirely true of trademarks,
where consumers retain an interest in a single supplier’s exclusive use of a mark in
order to be sure that they are getting the particular brand of goods they desire.”); Au-
Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (9th Cir.
2010) (“For example, a producer may purchase non-functioning Rolex watches and
refurbish them with non-Rolex parts, leaving only the original casing. Even if the
producer adequately explains the nature of the refurbished watches to purchasers, the
producer nonetheless infringes on Rolex’s trademarks by profiting from the Rolex
name. In such a case, the purchasers buy the watches in order to make others think
that they have bought a true Rolex watch.”) (citing Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 707–10 (9th Cir. 1999)). But see Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs
Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding first sale applied to
trademarked goods, even if possible that consumers erroneously believed reseller was
affiliated with trademark owner).
67. Barnes, supra note 11, at 461 n.6. In patent law, the terms “first sale” and
“patent exhaustion” are used interchangeably. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 16.03[2][a] (2005).
68. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1531–32 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U.S. 241, 260 (1942); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895)).
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The Court then quoted Kirtsaeng for first sale’s “impeccable historic
pedigree.”69 The Court further described first sale as a “venerable
principle.”70 The doctrine was rooted in:
hostility toward restraints on alienation. That enmity is reflected in
the exhaustion doctrine. The patent laws do not include the right to
“restrain [ ] . . . further alienation” after an initial sale; such condi-
tions have been “hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours”
and are “obnoxious to the public interest.”71
The Court then gave a modern example of Coke’s pronouncement:
Take a shop that restores and sells used cars. The business works
because the shop can rest assured that, so long as those bringing in
the cars own them, the shop is free to repair and resell those vehi-
cles. That smooth flow of commerce would sputter if companies that
make the thousands of parts that go into a vehicle could keep their
patent rights after the first sale. Those companies might, for in-
stance, restrict resale rights and sue the shop owner for patent in-
fringement. And even if they refrained from imposing such
restrictions, the very threat of patent liability would force the shop
to invest in efforts to protect itself from hidden lawsuits.72
The Court noted that in antitrust cases, it had been no defense to a
charge of resale price maintenance that the goods were patented be-
cause the first sale exhausted the patent rights.73
In its second holding, the Court in Lexmark rejected the argument
that the territorial nature of intellectual property limited first sale’s
effect to sales made within the United States. Rather, first sale applies
to any sale of an authorized item, regardless of where the sale oc-
curs.74 The Court again rested principally on the policy against re-
straints on alienation:
69. Id. at 1532 (quoting Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538
(2013)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501 (1917)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1533 (“It is true that Boston Store and Univis involved resale price re-
strictions that, at the time of those decisions, violated the antitrust laws. But in both
cases it was the sale of the items, rather than the illegality of the restrictions, that
prevented the patentees from enforcing those resale price agreements through patent
infringement suits.”).
74. The Court made clear that exhaustion did not depend on a sale within the
United States:
The theory behind the Government’s express-reservation rule also wrongly
focuses on the likely expectations of the patentee and purchaser during a
sale. Exhaustion does not arise because of the parties’ expectations about
how sales transfer patent rights. More is at stake when it comes to patents
than simply the dealings between the parties, which can be addressed
through contract law. Instead, exhaustion occurs because, in a sale, the pat-
entee elects to give up title to an item in exchange for payment. Allowing
patent rights to stick remora-like to that item as it flows through the market
would violate the principle against restraints on alienation. Exhaustion does
not depend on whether the patentee receives a premium for selling in the
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Applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales is just as straightfor-
ward. Patent exhaustion, too, has its roots in the antipathy toward
restraints on alienation, . . . and nothing in the text or history of the
Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that borderless
common law principle to domestic sales.75
There is irony in the statement that nothing in the Patent Act stated
otherwise—patent exhaustion is an entirely judge-made doctrine, so
the Patent Act does not say anything about patent exhaustion in the
first place. But the Court did make clear that its guiding principle for
exhaustion was the policy against restraints on alienation. The Court
noted that first sale is expressly stated in the Copyright Act, and it
took that as support for following Kirtsaeng on the international ex-
haustion principle: [T]here is a “‘historic kinship between patent law
and copyright law,’ and the bond between the two leaves no room for
a rift on the question of international exhaustion.”76 Accordingly, a
patent holder has less power to partition markets for its patented item
because parties that acquire authorized items sold abroad may import
them into the United States without infringing the relevant patent.
The Court repeated the idea that first sale limits the patent or copy-
right holder to “one bite at the apple” when selling an item: “[T]he
right to exclude just ensures that the patentee receives one reward—
of whatever amount the patentee deems to be ‘satisfactory compensa-
tion’—for every item that passes outside the scope of the patent mo-
nopoly.”77 The Court then ended with a piscine flourish: “Instead,
exhaustion occurs because, in a sale, the patentee elects to give up
title to an item in exchange for payment. Allowing patent rights to
stick remora-like to that item as it flows through the market would
violate the principle against restraints on alienation.”78 After Kirt-
saeng and Lexmark, first sale rests on the policy against restraints on
alienation, and so serves as a limit on contracts involving patented or
copyrighted goods, not simply to fill a gap in the parties’ agreement.
II. HOW BROADLY DOES THE FIRST SALE EXTEND, IF IT IS
TO PREVENT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION?
First sale is not a complete ban on restraints on alienation. The first-
sale doctrine in copyright provides by statute that the owner of an
United States, or the type of rights that buyers expect to receive. As a result,
restrictions and location are irrelevant; what matters is the patentee’s deci-
sion to make a sale.
Id. at 1538.
75. Id. at 1536.
76. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
439 (1984)).
77. Id. at 1537 (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661
(1895)).
78. Id. at 1538.
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authorized copy may sell that copy79 or display80 that copy without
infringing the copyright holder’s exclusive rights to do the same. That
does not mean that, once sold, a copy passes to the owner free of the
relevant copyright. First sale eliminates the distribution right and the
display right of the physical copy purchased.81 First sale leaves in ef-
fect the other exclusive rights: to make copies, to adapt the work, and
to perform the work in public. First sale also has limits keeping even
the distribution right in place for some transactions. It is impermissi-
ble for the owner of a copy of a computer program or music recording
to rent that copy out82 for direct or indirect commercial gain.  This is
to prevent businesses from providing short-term rentals to those wish-
ing not to use the copies during rental but rather to make unautho-
rized copies.
Restraints on alienation have been described as a “longstanding but
under-theorized concern;”83 there is no generally accepted underlying
policy for the general hostility to restraints on alienation.84 The
Court’s latest statements thus supply the view of the party with the
most power to govern the doctrine, at least in the largely federal area
of intellectual property.85 The Court has quite firmly stated that the
first sale doctrine rests on the traditional common law policy against
restraints on alienation. The rationale for that policy is economic: to
keep property free of entanglements that could put friction in the
79. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
80. Id. § 109(c).
81. Specifically, that part of the display right pertaining to direct or projected dis-
plays, but not displays via other means, such as online. Id. § 109(c).
82. For example:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), . . . neither the owner of a
particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy of a
computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying
such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial ad-
vantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that pho-
norecord or computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium
embodying such program) by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or
practice in the nature of rental, lease, or lending.
Id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
83. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 903
(2008).
84. See Robinson, supra note 55, at 1480 (footnote omitted) (“The common law
has invalidated restraints on alienation of property from time out of mind. The pedi-
gree of the rule may account for the paucity of reasons for it.”).
85. Restraints on alienation are distinct from servitudes which restrict use of the
property (and have been compared to intellectual property licensing terms which limit
use of the subject matter), but do not prevent its alienation; the two are related in that
both burden property, and so may increase transaction costs. See Van Houweling,
supra note 83, at 903 (“Most servitudes do not directly restrain transfer. They merely
limit the rights that can be acquired from any single owner. So a subsequent user who
wants to reassemble property rights into a useful bundle must tackle the transaction
costs involved in multiple negotiations. Often the problem is not so much restraint on
alienation as restraint on acquisition: every individual property stick can be sold; the
difficulty is buying a bundle that is useful to own.”) (footnote omitted).
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gears of commerce. That could be interpreted several ways. First sale
could be seen as minimizing transaction costs.86 As in the Lexmark
example, if thousands of patent holders assert rights in the various
parts of a car, a repair shop might possibly have to transact with them
in order to repair the car. The opinions could also be seen as guarding
against leveraging power in one market into a separate market (which
can raise issues of antitrust or of patent misuse or copyright misuse).
The patent holder gets paid once when the item is sold and cannot use
that leverage later on in another market.87 Another economic ratio-
nale might be hostility to price discrimination.88 By extending fair use
to international first sales,89 the decision prevented the rights holder
from charging one price in the United States and another price over-
seas and using the importation right to prevent arbitrage, where an
entrepreneur like Kirtsaeng might buy in a low-price jurisdiction and
sell in the high-price jurisdiction, taking away sales from the copyright
or patent holder.
A. Common Law View of Restraints on Alienation
The common law cases also looked to efficiency, albeit through a
slightly different lens. The typical restraint on alienation case arose in
86. See id. at 902–03 (“Inefficient but transaction-cost-insulated servitudes re-
present a species of the anticommons problem described by Michael Heller with re-
gard to fragmentation of property interests more generally. Servitudes divide rights in
a single parcel of land among multiple owners. If it is later desirable to consolidate
those rights in order to put the resource to its best use, fragmentation of the property
bundle (and the transaction costs involved in re-bundling) can make consolidation
difficult . . .”) (footnote omitted).
87. See, e.g., PE´TER MEZEI, COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION LAW AND POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 11–13 (2018) (discussing several aspects
of this general policy).
88. On price discrimination in intellectual property, see generally INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter Menell & Ben Depoorter, eds., 2019);
Michael Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55
(2001); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination, 73 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 1367, 1367–68 (1998).
89. Note that there are economic arguments in favor of permitting price discrimi-
nation. See Katz, supra note 19, at 77–78 (“The main benefits of price discrimination
are suggested to be threefold: (1) it increases output, thereby ameliorating some of
the inefficiencies otherwise associated with the exclusivity inherent in IP rights and
benefiting consumers with lower ability to pay who would not be able to obtain the
product if the seller could set only a uniform price; (2) increased output may contrib-
ute to achieving economies of scale and learning resulting in lower per-unit costs; and
(3) even when output under price discrimination is lower compared to uniform pric-
ing, the additional monopoly profit will encourage investment in R&D and innova-
tion and contribute to dynamic efficiency. In sum, the argument for price
discrimination is that it promotes allocative efficiency (i.e., leads to higher output and/
or lower costs) and dynamic efficiency (encourages innovation).”) (footnotes omit-
ted); GHOSH & CALBOLI, supra note 7, at 38 (“The economic rationale for price dis-
crimination is that uniform pricing leaves certain consumers excluded from the
market.”).
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a quite different context than those in intellectual property cases. Re-
straints on alienation were disfavored, among other reasons, because
they could reduce incentives for a property owner to devise more pro-
ductive uses of the property.90 If a restraint on alienation prevented
change in the use of property or prevented the owner from selling the
improved property at an increased price, the property owner would
have little incentive to put resources into making the property more
productive or valuable. The same rationale applies to intellectual
property. If the rightsholder is unable to enforce restraints on the use
and ownership of items sold, that leaves owners free to make innova-
tive uses or improvements that the rightsholder had not come up
with.91 So the policy against restraints on alienation could be seen as a
policy against transaction costs, leveraging into new markets (such as
the secondary market for compatible parts, as in Lexmark),92 or
against price discrimination93 (as in Kirtsaeng) or against restrictions
on new uses of property—all of which could be put under the um-
brella of economic efficiency.
It is worth noting that is not clear that first sale promotes any or all
of these values. Rules that bar sellers from using one kind of conduct
may simply channel sellers into even more inefficient behavior, rather
than opening up the market. Especially in this era of complicated
products, a seller that cannot rely on exclusive rights (because first
sale cuts them off) or contractual restrictions (because first sale super-
sedes them) may turn to using technological measures.94 If Lexmark
cannot legally prevent resale of its printer cartridges, it may build the
cartridges (or the printer) so that the cartridges do not work after the
first use, or so that only Lexmark can refill them, or so that they trig-
ger ominous warning if refilled by a reseller (“Warning—non-compat-
ible ink cartridge detected”). In addition, restraints on alienation
could be efficient. The Supreme Court compared them to remoras,95
fish that stick to sharks and whales.96 But remoras are not necessarily
90. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 21, at 282 (“Allowing the current owner to sell or
transfer ownership of the property grants that owner both the liberty to move and the
power to obtain the economic benefits of the property by selling it and suing those
assets for other endeavors.”).
91. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doc-
trine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 474–78 (2008).
92. A related way to interpret that rationale is the antitrust prohibition on resale
price maintenance. See Katz, supra note 19, at 142 (citing KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTI-
TRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 261 (2003)).
93. Id. at 84 (“More generally, recognizing that the welfare effect of price discrimi-
nation is ambiguous, contemporary literature believes that there is no compelling ba-
sis for antitrust law to prohibit price discrimination.”).
94. See GHOSH & CALBOLI, supra note 7, at 16 (“Even if the principle of interna-
tional exhaustion applies to physical goods, geoblocking can prevent resale and reuse
of digital goods.”).
95. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1538 (2017).
96. Remora, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/animal/
remora (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7ZLX-C25X].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 17 14-APR-20 15:24
2020] FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 513
parasites, but rather they may have symbiotic relationships with
sharks and whales.97
The Court’s reliance on economic factors is important. Restraints
on alienation, in their historical pedigree in real property, were most
often considered in cases involving real estate.98 As the concern trans-
ferred to movable property, the cases often involved commercial mat-
ters like the transferability of stock certificates.99 So how the doctrine
would be considered in some areas of intellectual property, especially
copyright, affecting artistic works, might bring other factors into
play.100
Looking at the “historic pedigree” of the antipathy to restraints on
alienation throws some light on the Court’s reliance. The traditional
plaints against restraints on alienation are quite different from those
put forward in Lexmark:
Total restraints on the alienation of fee simple interests have con-
sistently been ruled to be unenforceable on the grounds that the
free alienation of property furthers important societal goals. Among
these goals are promoting the dispersal of property so that land
ownership is not concentrated in a small number of wealthy fami-
lies, ensuring that resources are controlled by the current owners
rather than past ones, and facilitating the transfer of property to the
owner who values the resource most highly.101
Lexmark and Kirtsaeng do not stand for the proposition that first
sale overcomes any and all possible restraints on alienation. Where
the line might be drawn was not an issue in those cases because both
were blatant, complete restraints on alienation (no resale and no im-
portation, respectively). Were the restraints less blunt, then the ques-
tion could have arisen: whether the restraints were reasonable. Here,
there could be a different application to the first sale doctrine. In cop-
yright, first sale is a statutory rule.102 Kirtsaeng simply dealt with a
matter of interpretation of the statute, whether first sale’s limitation
on the distribution right included the importation right (which is de-
fined as a supplement to the distribution right). In patent law, by con-
97. See id.
98. Cf. Robinson, supra note 55, at 1455 (“Thus few occasions arise for consider-
ing the validity of personal property servitudes as a matter of general common law.”).
99. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 29 A.D.2d 481, 484–85, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (App.
Div. 1968) (holding that requirement for consent of other stockholder to transfer
stock certificate was an “unwarrantable and unlawful restraint on the sale of personal
property”).
100. See Robinson, supra note 55, at 1462 (“Moving from common law property to
intellectual property is a bit more difficult because of fundamental differences in the
property rights regimes.”).
101. Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Fu-
ture, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 774–75 (2002) (citing JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL.,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 572 (2d ed. 1997)).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
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trast, first sale (exhaustion) is a judicially created doctrine,103 and its
scope has long been unsettled.104 Until Lexmark, the governing law
under Federal Circuit precedent was that patent exhaustion was effec-
tively a default rule, subject to rearrangement by the contract between
the parties to that first sale. In the leading case, Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit had held that restrictions in the sale
of a patented medical device could be enforced as a matter of patent
law against remote purchasers.105 That holding was hard to reconcile
with the first sale generally, as it conflicted with the non-enforceability
of similar restrictions in such cases as Bobbs-Merrill.106 Mallinckrodt
was overruled by the Supreme Court in Lexmark. After Lexmark,
however, the Court retained the power to define the scope of first sale
in patent. Additionally, even though copyright defines first sale by
statute, the Court has considerable leeway in interpreting the statute
(as demonstrated in Kirtsaeng), and in deciding the extent to which
first sale, as federal law, preempts contract and copyright law. Kirt-
saeng looked to general principles, rather than the particular language
of the copyright statute, in emphasizing the policy against restraints on
alienation.107
B. “Reasonableness” of Restraints on Alienation
To accurately convey the rule and policies from the common law,
the rational underlying first sale would be that unreasonable restraints
on alienation are not effective. The “modern trend,” as embodied in
the Restatement, is that restraints on alienation are enforceable if rea-
sonable: “A servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of
the burdened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable. Reason-
103. First sale could also be applied judicially in state areas of intellectual property,
such as the right of publicity. See Nannette Diacovo, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold:
The First Sale Doctrine Defense in Right of Publicity Actions, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REV. 57, 92 (1995).
104. First sale is also judicially created in trademark law, with similar questions
about its scope. See Barnes, supra note 11, at 458 (discussing Au-Tomotive Gold Inc.
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010)) (“In May 2010, in
what appears to be the first case addressing the issue, the Federal Circuit Court for
the Ninth Circuit relied on the free-rider rationale to hold that the first sale rule was
not an affirmative defense in trademark post-sale confusion cases.”).
105. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708–09 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
106. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 501–02 (“The second historical exception to
first sale aggressiveness occurred more recently, when the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit revived Justice Lurton’s attempt to make the doctrine turn on realistic
threats of monopoly. The Mallinckrodt case once again distinguished ‘conditional’
sales, which occur when the patentee places restrictions on the rights of purchasers,
thus conveying away less than its entire patent interest in the article in question.”)
(footnote omitted).
107. Katz, supra note 19, at 123 (“The majority solved the problem by opting for
international exhaustion, emphasizing the common law (rather than statutory) origin
of the doctrine, and evincing strong commitment to the continuing relevance of the
common law’s hostility to restraints on alienation.”).
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ableness is determined by weighing the utility of the restraint against
the injurious consequences of enforcing the restraint.”108 The
Lexmark Court did not note this distinction, speaking only of the
“common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chat-
tels.”109 In Lexmark and Kirtsaeng, however, the reasonableness rule
may have been irrelevant. Both dealt with direct and complete re-
straints on alienation: a contractual prohibition against resale in
Lexmark and a bar against importation in Kirtsaeng. Reasonableness
may have seemed a moot point in those cases. But if restraints on
alienation are to be the key policy behind first sale, then the reasona-
bleness of a restraint should be germane to whether a limitation is
equivalent to first sale (for express preemption) and for whether it
conflicts with first sale (for conflict preemption).110
The common law cases offer a spectrum of cases on the reasonable-
ness of restraints on alienation. For example, courts have differed in
the real estate area on whether due-on-sale clauses constitute an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation.111 Similarly, courts are divided
about whether a right of first refusal is an unreasonable restraint on
alienation.112 Courts look at whether the right of first refusal is rea-
sonably geared to protect an interest of the former owner. For exam-
ple, where there was a perpetual option to purchase in the event of
any offer for the property, which did not protect any interest of the
option holder geared to the land, the restraint was held unreasona-
ble.113 A right to purchase a warehouse at a price well below market,
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
109. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1526.
110. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(applying patent preemption); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (providing for copyright
preemption of state law).
111. See Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Venco P’ship, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Neb.
1980) (“We are somewhat at a loss to understand how or why so many courts have
been willing to describe a ‘due on sale’ clause as a restraint on alienation and we are
unwilling to do so.”).
112. An unadorned right of first refusal (“ROFR”) is likely enforceable, but rights
of first refusal are often unreasonable where they set a below market option price or
have other restrictions that interfere with market sales. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Private
Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning Up the Mess, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 419,
436 (2010) (“Because of their minimal impact upon alienability, nearly all classic
ROFRs will satisfy the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.”).
113. See, e.g., Laska v. Barr, 2018 S.D. 6, ¶ 28, 907 N.W.2d 47, 55 (2018). (“The
Laskas need only receive a third-party offer to trigger the Barr Partners’ right to
purchase the property for $10,500 per acre, which right to purchase exists for eternity.
Because there is a significant interference with the Laskas’ ability to transfer the
property without a strong purpose justifying the restraint, the practical effect of the
restraint, if imposed, will prevent the long-term improvement and marketability of
Juffer Three. The court did not err when it held that the right of first refusal is an
unreasonable restraint on alienation and repugnant to the interest created.”); Iglehart
v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 615 (Fla. 1980) (“It is the generally accepted rule that a
fixed price repurchase option of unlimited duration, independent of the lease, is an
unreasonable restraint.”); Mo. St. Hwy. Comm’n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. App.
1958); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.63–.67 (A. J. Casner ed., 1952); see also
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in the event that the warehouse was no longer used, was an invalid
restraint on alienation.114 By contrast, the right to match market rate
offers was held reasonable.115 A key factor is maintaining incentives
to use the land productively:116 “An option for a fixed price clearly
discourages any improvements of the land by the existing property
owner because he could never recover the value of the improvements
should the optionee exercise the option.”117 A long-term option to
repurchase at a fixed price deadens the incentive to make the property
more valuable.118 A right of refusal at market price, by contrast, pre-
serves the incentives to use the property productively.119
The policy against restraints on alienation rested on real property
considerations:
The rule against restraints on alienation is based upon, among other
things, the desirability of keeping property responsive to the current
exigencies of its current beneficial owner and upon the desirability
of avoiding the retardation of the natural development of a commu-
4 DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 2015 (1979); 7 DAVID A.
THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 3574 (1962).
114. Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d 853, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994,
no pet.) (“We conclude that $ 79,955.38 is unreasonable as a matter of law to pay for
real estate valued at approximately $550,000.”).
115. Lorentzen v. Smith, 2000-NMCA-067, 129 N.M. 278, 283, 5 P.3d 1082, 1087
(“The contractual rights of first refusal before us in this appeal are not forfeiture
restraints; they are merely preemptive provisions as described in Section 4.4 of the
Restatement. Thus, they are enforceable as long as the price and timing are reasona-
ble. The reasonableness of the price is self-evident: either matching a bona fide offer
for the 52-acre tract, or offering fair market appraised value for Lot One.”).
116. Camino Gardens Ass’n, Inc. v. McKim, 612 So. 2d 636, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (“This provision reduces the incentive of mortgage lenders to finance the
purchase of this property because the lender will bear the burden of providing funds
and bear the risk of potential devaluation, while the Association receives all the bene-
fits of any appreciation in the property’s value. In essence, this repurchase option
amounts to a right of first refusal based on a fixed price rather than the fair market
value of the property. Pursuant to Inglehart [sic], such a provision is void as a matter
of law.”).
117. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 615 (Fla. 1980).
118. Cf. Randolph v. Terrell, 768 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1987, writ de-
nied) (“In our view, the option or right of first refusal provided by the deed at hand
was not reasonable in at least two respects. First, it provided that the grantors person-
ally could repurchase the lands at any time during their lifetimes for the same consider-
ation paid to them in 1959 by the grantee and secondly, no limit was placed on the
time allowed for the actual exercise of the option.”).
119. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954
So. 2d 742, 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), approved, 986 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2008). The
court held:
The option right in this case is at market value. It states: “the Association
shall have the right of first refusal for the purchase of said real property
upon the same terms and conditions as are proposed for its sale by [Owner].”
[e.s.] Obviously from its plain text, the option is triggered only when Owner
proposes to sell the property. In offering to sell, Owner could either specify a
price or let buyers make the offer. Either way, it is market value that is the
basis for the option.
Id.
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nity by removing property from the ordinary channels of trade and
commerce.120
In evaluating the reasonableness of a restraint, the Restatement sug-
gests looking at whether it really restrains the seller: “The standard
against which the impact of a restraint is to be measured is that of the
property owner free to transfer property at his or her convenience at a
price determined by the market.”121
Courts and state legislatures have dealt with a restraint on aliena-
tion of real estate that is quite similar to a resale royalty right. “Pri-
vate transfer fee covenants” may provide that, when real estate is sold,
a percentage (usually around 1%) will go to the original developer of
the real estate, to a co-op association, or to some other party.122
Whether such restraints are reasonable is unsettled. Professor
Freymuth classified them into three groups:
The first imposes a fee payable to an owners’ association to fund
community services, amenities, or both. The second imposes a fee
payable to a nonprofit organization to fund the organization’s oper-
ations or activities, which may or may not be directly or indirectly
related to the ownership of the affected lot. The third imposes a fee
payable to the developer for which the lot owner receives no contin-
uing services or benefits beyond acquisition of the land.123
Until fairly recently, such fees were relatively uncommon. Because the
covenants likely did not “touch and concern” the land, they were gen-
erally unenforceable. The touch and concern requirement was lopped
off in the Third Restatement of Property in the year 2000, and develop-
ers and others began to use private transfer fee covenants.124 Profes-
sor Freymuth suggested that transfer fee covenants to homeowners
associations would likely be reasonable, as they fund vetting of pur-
chasers, maintenance costs, and stability of the association.125 Transfer
fee covenants to non-profits to support such efforts as local conserva-
tion efforts are also likely enforceable because they would benefit the
120. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities, Etc. § 88 (citing Venture Stores, Inc. v. Pac. Beach
Co. Inc., 980 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998); Winecellar Farm, Inc. v. Hibbard,
27 A.3d 777 (N.H. 2011)).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c. (AM. LAW. INST.
2019).
122. See generally Freyermuth, supra note 112.
123. Id. at 424.
124. Id. at 451 (“Under the traditional if-the-benefit-is-in-gross-the-burden-won’t-
run rule, a developer had little incentive to impose private transfer fee covenants.
Given their analytical similarity to quarter sales, courts were unlikely to enforce such
covenants against successors. In the wake of the Third Restatement, however, the use
of private transfer fee covenants has accelerated. The Third Restatement appears to
have encouraged the spread of such covenants by purporting to reject the traditional
prophylactic rule in favor of a reasonableness standard that presumes covenants are
reasonable.”) (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 452.
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residents,126 consistent with the general rule that charitable gifts may
include restraints on alienation.127 Fees that benefit a charity with lit-
tle link to the real estate would be more borderline.128 Private fee
covenants that simply provided a stream of income to the original de-
veloper, on the other hand, are likely unreasonable. The greatest fac-
tor is diversion of funds away from the continuing real estate to the
developer, in effect eroding the tax base.129 The argument for reason-
ableness is that the fee allows the initial price to be lower, as the buyer
discounts the price by the future obligation to pay upon resale. But
buyers are unlikely to accurately gauge the necessary discount, given
the difficulty of forecasting how long they will own the property and
how its price will change.130 Transfer fees may also add transaction
costs, accrued in identifying who now owns the transfer fee rights
(which themselves may have been transferred), figuring out how they
are accounted for at closing, and dealing with possible multiple trans-
fer fees.131
Courts are still dealing with whether private transfer fees are en-
forceable.132 In the meantime, state legislatures have enacted statutes
largely invalidating private transfer fees (that is, transfer fees payable
not to the homeowners association or to a non-profit such as a conser-
126. Id. at 426–27 (“While this fee will have an impact upon all buyers within Sun-
rise, the benefit to the general public (preservation of environmentally sensitive land
and environmental education) and to the individual Sunrise residents (potential en-
hancement in the value of lots within Sunrise created by proximity and/or access to
the conserved land) arguably may offset this impact.”).
127. Horse Pond Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Cormier, 581 A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1990)
(“In other words, an express provision or condition against alienation contained in a
gift made to a charitable trust or charitable corporation may constitute a valid
restraint.”).
128. Freyermuth, supra note 112, at 427 (“Because the LCHF transfer fee provides
for no services or facilities benefitting owners within any development, one expects
such a covenant to have only a negative impact upon the value of the affected lots.
One might nevertheless defend the LCHF covenant as justified based upon its general
charitable purpose and the fact that its small fee only has a de minimis effect on the
land’s value.”).
129. Id. at 463–64 (footnote omitted) (“Finally, and most importantly, the financial
benefit that a private transfer fee covenant creates for the developer comes at the
public’s expense. To the extent that a private transfer fee covenant is enforceable
against successors, it reduces the value of the affected land. This reduction artificially
decreases the ad valorem tax base of the broader public community of which the
affected land is a part. Incremental sums that would have funded public goods in the
local community—such as public education, policing, fire protection, streets, sewers,
and other community services—instead are diverted into the pockets of private devel-
opers. Furthermore, this situation happens not by a public vote, but by private con-
tract. Sound public policy cannot and should not permit private action, taken outside
the community’s democratic processes, to divert the tax base for private benefit.”).
130. Id. at 457.
131. Id. at 462–63.
132. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 21, at 285 (“Provisions that require future pur-
chasers to pay a fee to the original grantor also may well be struck down as unreason-
able restraints on alienation.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 23 14-APR-20 15:24
2020] FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 519
vation group) in some forty-three states.133 That posture leaves it
somewhat difficult to assess whether, by analogy, a resale royalty right
is an unreasonable restraint on alienation. If forty-three states have
effectively prohibited private transfer fees, then that could be seen as
a public policy determination that they are indeed unreasonable. On
the other hand, the fact that states needed to enact the ban by legisla-
tion rather than by judicial interpretation suggests that under the com-
mon law, the transfer fees would not be deemed unreasonable.
Looking to the underlying policy of first sale could also help courts
address boundary issues about the first sale doctrine. For example,
one question is: What dispositions of a work give first sale rights? First
sale applies if the work is sold, but does it apply if the work is given
away,134 abandoned,135 traded, or left in a will? In copyright, first-sale
rights go to the owner of an authorized copy, so all such transfers
would likely convey first-sale rights.136 In patent, the doctrine is judge-
made, so courts would have to decide.137 By considering the underly-
ing policy, the decision may be made less of an all-or-nothing choice.
If a copy is donated, first-sale rights will attach, but restrictions on the
gift may be more likely to be deemed reasonable than restrictions on a
commercially marketed item, just as restricted gifts of real estate for
such charitable purposes of environmental conservation or historical
preservation are more likely to survive judicial scrutiny.138
133. Private Transfer & Development Impact Fees, NAT. ASS’N REALTORS, https://
www.nar.realtor/private-transfer-development-impact-fees (last visited Oct. 28, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/QW8K-5J3L].
134. See LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“At bottom, a patentee has a choice as to how to secure its reward. A
patentee may ‘demand[ ]’ a particular price in exchange for an ‘article and the inven-
tion which it embodies.’ . . . Alternately, a patentee may choose to give that article
away for free in the hope of obtaining a future benefit, as LifeScan did here. But a
patentee cannot evade patent exhaustion principles by choosing to give the article
away rather than charging a particular price for it. Where a patentee unconditionally
parts with ownership of an article, it cannot later complain that the approach that it
chose results in an inadequate reward and that therefore ordinary principles of patent
exhaustion should not apply.”); Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns,
Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding first sale rights apply to items given
away).
135. For a paper concluding that first sale should apply to abandoned property,
such as the murals by the noted pseudonymous artist Banksy, see Dan Karmel, Off
the Wall: Abandonment and the First Sale Doctrine, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
353, 377 (2012) (“He had the choice of how, where, and when to release his works to
the public. Perhaps most importantly, he had the choice of whether to release his
works. He should not be able to subsequently place additional restrictions on what
may be done with them.”).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
137. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017)
(discussing how exhaustion is a common law doctrine applied by courts to the patent
statute).
138. Cf. SINGER, supra note 21, at 282 (“Restraints on alienation are generally al-
lowed when the holder of the property interest is a charity.”).
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Another issue of considerable practical importance is whether to
recognize “digital first sale.”139 If someone owns a digital copy of mu-
sic or a movie, he or she might wish to sell it to someone over the
internet. If he or she simply sent a copy electronically, that would
likely not fit within the technical boundaries of copyright’s first sale
doctrine, which only apply to the copy that person owns.140 The Sec-
ond Circuit recently held that first sale did not protect the operator of
an online service for selling used music, even where it sought to en-
sure that only one party would have a copy of the music once sold.141
Economically, however, the transaction seems equivalent to selling an
authorized copy, provided the seller destroys his copy.142 In sum, the
common law cases on the reasonableness of restraints on alienation
provide a guide toward interpreting first sale as motivated by the pol-
icy against restraints on alienation. The next Sections look at two live
issues on the extent of first sale: resale royalty rights for artists and
resale of software. Federal copyright law invalidates unreasonable re-
straints on alienation.143 Can state law require payments to artists
when their works are resold? Can state contract law permit software
sellers to prevent resale of software, by characterizing transactions as
mere licenses, as opposed to sales?
III. WHETHER FIRST SALE PREEMPTS RESALE
ROYALTY RIGHTS FOR ARTISTS
Federal copyright law and patent law preempt state law in their re-
spective areas.144 The extent of preemption (as with the extent of first
sale) is unsettled because the Supreme Court has taken few cases on
the question. The most recent intellectual property case on preemp-
tion was Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc.145 in 1989, and
139. See, e.g., MEZEI, supra note 87, at 92–148 (arguing that first sale should be
extended to the digital context).
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2018).
141. See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2760 (2019).
142. See id. at 658 (“In addition, even if ReDigi effectively compensated (by offset-
ting deletions) for the making of unauthorized reproductions in violation of the rights
holder’s exclusive reproduction right under § 106(1), nonetheless ReDigi’s process it-
self involves the making of unauthorized reproductions that infringe the exclusive
reproduction right unless justified under fair use. We are not free to disregard the
terms of the statute merely because the entity performing an unauthorized reproduc-
tion makes efforts to nullify its consequences by the counterbalancing destruction of
the preexisting phonorecords.”).
143. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2017)
(discussing how copyright’s first sale doctrine is rooted in the common law principle
against restraints on alienation).
144. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(applying patent preemption); 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (preemption with respect to
other laws (providing for copyright preemption of state law)).
145. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168 (“By offering patent-like protection for ideas
deemed unprotected under the present federal scheme, the Florida statute conflicts
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the Supreme Court has never applied the statutory preemption provi-
sion in the Copyright Act, enacted in 1976.146
A. Restraints on Alienation as Artists’ Moral Rights
Kirtsaeng and Lexmark both dealt with commercial actors attempt-
ing to leverage their intellectual property rights to control markets.147
Kirtsaeng was an attempt to maintain price discrimination between
domestic and foreign markets.148 Lexmark effectively dealt with the
ability to prevent aftermarket competition, as well as following Kirt-
saeng with respect to international dimensions.149 The doctrine of re-
straints on alienation might play out differently in the context of
artworks. In the realm of art, many countries have long recognized the
moral rights of artists to prevent distortion of their works, to receive
proper attribution of their authorship, and other protections of the
author’s artistic claims.150 The United States extended moral rights to
a set of artists in order to join the leading international copyright
with the strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit
patent protection. . . . We therefore agree with the majority of the Florida Supreme
Court that the Florida statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause.”) (internal cita-
tion and quotations omitted).
146. See David E. Shipley, Droit De Suite, Copyright’s First Sale Doctrine and Pre-
emption of State Law, 39 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2017) (“The high court
has not addressed a preemption issue in the general field of intellectual property since
the Bonito Boats decision in 1989, and it has never addressed a preemption issue
arising under section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976.”).
147. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 540 (2013); Lexmark,
137 S. Ct. at 1529.
148. Note that whether price discrimination should be prohibited is a debated ques-
tion. Price discrimination may be beneficial to both sellers and buyers, by allowing
transactions at a range of prices to different sorts of buyers. In addition, even where
price discrimination is harmful, prohibiting it may simply channel sellers to even more
harmful practices. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976—First Sale Doctrine—Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 127 HARV. L. REV. 348, 353 (2013) (“In this case, because
copyright holders have multiple alternative avenues for circumventing the effects of
the first sale doctrine, the Court’s decision will primarily impact the method by which
copyright holders engage in price discrimination rather than the overall magnitude of
price discrimination.”).
149. See Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1534–37 (discussing Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. 519).
150. “That artists have certain ‘moral rights’ in their work is a doctrine long recog-
nized in civil-law countries but only recently imported into the United States.” Kelley
v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 296 (7th Cir. 2011). Moral rights are generally
grouped into two categories: rights of attribution and rights of integrity. Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing RALPH E. LERNER &
JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 419–20 (1989)). “Rights of attribution” generally include
the artist’s right to be recognized as the author of his work, to publish anonymously
and pseudonymously, to prevent attribution of his name to works he did not create,
and to prevent his work from being attributed to other artists. See id. “Rights of integ-
rity” include the artist’s right to prevent the modification, mutilation, or distortion of
his work, and in some cases (if the work is of recognized stature), to prevent its de-
struction. Id. at 81–82.
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treaty, the Berne Convention.151 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(“VARA”) affords artists positive rights of attribution: “to claim au-
thorship of that work” and “to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create.”152
This Act also prohibits misattribution, giving the right “to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author” of the work if it has been dis-
torted or modified, if that would be “prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation.”153 The Act further provides protection to the work itself,
providing the artist the right “to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be preju-
dicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.”154
For some works of a particular status, there is an additional right of
integrity “to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a
violation of that right.”155 The VARA, notably, is limited to a subset
of authors, giving rights only to the author of a “work of visual art,”156
which is defined in considerable detail to include a “painting, drawing,
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies” or certain photographs, likewise limited to 200 signed copies
or fewer.157 Similarly, under the California statute, the author’s rights
151. See Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention As a Canon of Construction:
Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 115 (2005) (“When the
United States finally joined the Berne Convention, the first ‘true’ multilateral conven-
tion on copyright, in 1988, its obligations included compliance with article 6bis which,
among other things, announces authors’ right ‘to claim authorship’ to their works.”)
(footnotes omitted).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018); H.R. REP. NO. 101–514, at 2 (1990), as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6924.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
156. Id. § 106A.
157. The Copyright Act defines a “work of visual art” as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.
A work of visual art does not include—
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
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are not transferable, but may be waived—in the sense only that the
artist and buyer may agree that the artist will be entitled to more than
5% of future sales, which one could consider an usual meaning of the
word “waiver.”158
The VARA raises the question of whether restraints on alienation
would be enforceable if they served the artistic-control purposes sup-
ported by VARA instead of the market-control purposes at issue in
Kirtsaeng and Lexmark.159 The VARA could be seen as a recognition
of the general principle that the artistic integrity of artists may be rec-
ognized and so that agreements with respect to the integrity of
artworks should be enforced. Consistent with that recognition, rights
under the VARA may not be transferred—a restraint on alienation
built right into the Act itself.160 One could also look at how the Court
recognized the first-sale interest of “libraries, used-book dealers, tech-
nology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums.”161 By
the same token, the Court could recognize the special reliance of art-
ists on using agreements to structure their artistic works.
On the other hand, the VARA could also be characterized instead
as a carefully limited exception to the general principles of copyright
law. The rights under VARA have meticulously limited boundaries;
the works to which the VARA applies are a small section of the uni-
verse of copyrighted works, and the rights are nontransferable and
savable. In this view, the VARA would not support an extension of
artist’s right by reading another exception into the statutory first sale
doctrine.
If the policy behind first sale is to prevent restraints on alienation,
then the policy would not extend to bar rules that do not qualify as
restraints on alienation. As courts have recognized, “not every imped-
iment to a sale is a restraint on alienation.”162 In addition, reasonable
restraints on alienation might still be effective.
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
158. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (2007) with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (“Transfer
And Waiver.—(1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but
those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written
instrument signed by the author.”).
159. But see Austin, supra note 151, at 126 (discussing preemption in intellectual
property as applied by the Supreme Court) (“Indeed, the Court has recognized that
some of the requirements that states may impose on the marketing of goods under
such circumstances in order to avoid confusion are not preempted.”).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
161. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 540 (2013).
162. Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Venco P’ship, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Neb.
1980) (“It is true that the possibility of acceleration may impede the ability of an
owner to sell his property as he wishes; nonetheless, not every impediment to a sale is
a restraint on alienation, let alone contrary to public policy. It is a fact that zoning
restrictions, building restrictions, or public improvements may impede the sale and
substantially affect the ability of an owner to realize a maximum price. Yet no one
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B. Resale Royalties as Restraints on Alienation
A case that tees up those issues is Close v. Sotheby’s, in which the
Ninth Circuit held that the federal Copyright Act preempted a state
resale royalty act.163 Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act states that
federal law preempts all state law rights that are “equivalent” to “any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.164 The
California Resale Royalties Act (“CRRA”) granted artists 5% of the
proceeds in the event of resale of their artwork.165 The seller was re-
quired to pay 5% of the sale to the artist166 or, if the artist could not
be located, the California Arts Council.167 The Council would attempt
to locate the artist, and if unsuccessful after seven years, could use the
funds to acquire art for public buildings.168 The Act applied to sales in
California and sales outside California by California residents (the lat-
ter provision, however, had been held invalid as contrary to the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause under the United States Constitution169). The
rights were limited to “a work of fine art,” defined as “an original
painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass.”170
The CRRA did not apply to sales for less than $1,000, or works by an
artist who died before 1983.171 The right was not perpetual, rather
lasting until the twentieth anniversary of the death of the artist.172 The
right could not be waived, other than by an agreement to pay a
greater royalty than 5%.173
suggests that such restrictions or covenants as a class, are invalid simply because they
affect the ease with which one may dispose of one’s property.”).
163. Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018). For discussion of
the enactment and background of the California statute, see DeBor, supra note 23.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2018) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published
or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.”).
165. Close, 894 F.3d at 1064. The statute provided: “Whenever a work of fine art is
sold and the seller resides in California or the sale takes place in California, the seller
or the seller’s agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to such artist’s
agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2007).
For discussion of the act generally, see DeBor, supra note 23.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a).
167. Id. § 986(a)(2).
168. Id. § 986(a)(5).
169. In an earlier decision, the Ninth Circuit had held that the application of the
statute to out-of-state sales was invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause, but
that provision was separable from the rest of the statute and so did not invalidate the
entire statute. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1320–23 (9th Cir.
2015).
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(2).
171. Id. § 986(a)(7), (b)(2); Sam Francis Found., 784 F.3d at 1322.
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(7).
173. Id. § 986(a).
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The Ninth Circuit held that the California statute was preempted on
the grounds that it conflicted with copyright law’s first sale doctrine:
Although the CRRA’s resale royalty right and § 106(3)’s distribu-
tion right are not coextensive, they are equivalent. The two rights
differ in that one grants artists the right to receive a percentage pay-
ment on all sales of artwork after the first, while the other grants
artists the right to receive full payment on the first (and only the
first) sale. But, at root, both concern the distribution of copies of
artwork and define artists’ right (or lack thereof) to payment on
downstream sales of those copies.174
The court ultimately relied on the policy against restraints on aliena-
tion, as in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark:
The CRRA expands the federal distribution right because, whereas
the first sale doctrine limits artists’ right to payment to the first sale,
the CRRA grants artists an unwaivable right to a 5% royalty on all
downstream sales. See Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a). Indeed, the CRRA
is designed precisely to alter the first sale doctrine by affording art-
ists a right to at least some measure of payment on every sale after
the first. At the same time, the CRRA also restricts the federal dis-
tribution right by forbidding artists from fully alienating copies of
their artwork. In effect, the CRRA creates an inalienable restraint
on alienation.175
Note that the restraint in Close was of a much different nature than in
Kirtsaeng and Lexmark. In Kirtsaeng, the copyright holder argued that
the distribution right should prevent the owner of a copy, which had
been made with permission of the copyright holder, from importing it
into the United States.176 In Lexmark, the copyright holder argued
that the owner of a printer cartridge, who had purchased it from the
original buyer, was restrained from alienating that printer cartridge
because the original buyer had agreed not to resell it.177 In both cases,
the intellectual property holder was seeking to prevent the party from
transferring ownership of the property.178 In Close, by contrast, the
resale royalty right only came into effect if the party was able to alien-
ate the artwork.179 If the party resold an artwork, they then became
obliged to remit 5% of the sale proceeds to the artist.180 The question
would then become whether that rule, which is not a prohibition but
rather sort of private tax, is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
174. Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 2018).
175. Id. at 1071.
176. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 526–27 (2013).
177. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1525 (2017).
178. See id.; Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 526–27.
179. Close, 894 F.3d at 1070.
180. Id.
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Ironically, fine artists depend little on copyright; buyers are not in-
terested in copies.181 If copyright law preempts state law giving rights
to artists, such as resale royalty rights, then on balance copyright may
be a net loss for them.182 Viewed broadly, the Copyright Act itself is a
variety of restraints on alienation. The Act makes quite clear that a
physical copy of a work is separate from the copyright in the work,
and the copy may be sold and resold without selling the copyright.183
The Ninth Circuit rejected the distinction between requiring pay-
ment on resale and prohibiting resale: “Even though there are differ-
ences in how the CRRA and § 106(3) affect artists’ right to
payment—one requires a royalty on all sales after the first, and the
other contemplates full alienation upon the first sale—there is signifi-
cant overlap between the two for the reasons explained above.”184
That all-or-nothing view of first sale seems to prove too much. An
artist could certainly lease the copy, and retain ownership, meaning
that first sale does not require that all the payment be made at once.
Likewise, the property could be sold on credit, with the property itself
serving as collateral, in which case payments would be spread out over
time.185 If payments were not made, the artist could repossess the art-
work, a powerful restraint on alienation.
The Close court also had to contend with some contrary legislative
history, a subsequent House Report stating in clear terms: “For exam-
ple, the law will not preempt a cause of action for a misattribution of a
reproduction of a work of visual art or for a violation of a right to a
resale royalty.”186 The court simply declined to recognize the state-
ment as persuasive authority, on the grounds that it came long after
the Act was passed and “at best, represent[ed] the House’s under-
181. See Laura A. Heymann, Copyright and the Single Work, JOTWELL (Nov. 28,
2018) (discussing Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 313 (2018)) (Fine artists generally “have little to no desire to sell multiple copies
of their work, and the number of artists who can count on licensing their work for
derivative uses (museum postcards or calendars, for example) is few.”); see also Brian
Frye, Andy Warhol’s Pantry, 8 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 17 (2015).
182. See generally Heymann, supra note 181.
183. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2018) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclu-
sive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in
which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including
the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any
rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under
a copyright convey property rights in any material object.”).
184. Close, 894 F.3d at 1071.
185. A “transfer of copyright” is defined to include hypothecation, meaning using
the copyright as collateral. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“A ‘transfer of copyright ownership’
is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copy-
right, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonex-
clusive license.”).
186. Close, 894 F.3d at 1072 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931 (1990)).
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standing—right or wrong—of how existing law might intersect with
the changes proposed in VARA.”187
In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in the 1980 case of Morseburg v.
Balyon, had long ago held that the CRRA was not preempted by the
1909 Copyright Act because it did not conflict with the Act: “A resale
royalty is not provided by the 1909 Act; no hostility toward such a
royalty is expressed by the Act; and, on the facts before us, the obliga-
tion to pay a resale royalty does not impermissibly restrict resales by
the owners of works of fine art.”188 Close first held that Morseburg
was simply irrelevant to its analysis of express preemption under the
1976 Act because Morseburg dealt with implicit conflict preemption
under the 1909 Act.189 Although Morseburg was indeed decided
under a different version of the Copyright Act, its holding that the
CRRA did not “impermissibly restrict”190 resales could be relevant to
whether the CRRA impermissibly restricted the first sale right to re-
sell copies.
The court in Close noted that preemption under the 1909 Act might
be a live issue, to the extent sales fell between the CRRA’s effective
date, January 1, 1977, and the 1976 Act’s effective date, January 1,
1978.191 The court cast some doubt on its earlier holding but declined
ruling on the issue, rather remanding the case to see if there were any
sales during that period that were still at issue in the case.192 The court
also declined to rule on the issue of whether CRRA represented an
unconstitutional taking.193 Although signaling that CRRA seemed
similar to other restrictions that had been held permissible, the court
did not decide the question, as it had been made moot by defendant’s
successful copyright preemption attack.194
187. Id.
188. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1980); see also DeBor, supra
note 23.
189. Close, 894 F.3d at 1072 (“Furthermore, our reasoning in Morseburg derived
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldstein, and that case was grounded in a
different era of federal copyright law, before the Copyright Act even had an express
preemption provision. Morseburg did not pretend to speak to the preemptive effect of
the 1976 Act and does not control our express preemption analysis here.”).
190. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
191. Close, 894 F.3d at 1074.
192. Id. (“In sum, Morseburg’s reasoning would be suspect today, but it is not
clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority. It therefore controls our anal-
ysis of plaintiffs’ claims arising under the 1909 Act. We conclude that plaintiffs’ claims
concerning sales occurring between the CRRA’s effective date of January 1, 1977, and
the 1976 Act’s effective date of January 1, 1978 are not preempted. On remand, the
district court should determine if any of plaintiffs’ claims arise between January 1,
1977, and December 31, 1977.”).
193. Id. at 1075.
194. Id. (“In some respects at least, the droit de suite resembles legislation imposing
rent control, setting a minimum wage, or requiring a zoning permit. All of these mea-
sures impose real economic costs on people or businesses and may result in a wealth
transfer to someone else, but they are not, for that reason alone, a governmental
taking.”).
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An initial question unexamined by the court in Close would be
whether the resale royalty right even constitutes a restraint on aliena-
tion as opposed to a servitude of some sort.195 As defined by the Third
Restatement of Property, “Direct restraints include absolute prohibi-
tions on some or all types of transfers, including leases, prohibitions
on transfer without the consent of another, prohibitions on transfer to
particular persons, requirements of transfer to particular persons, op-
tions to purchase land, and rights of first refusal.”196 There is a good
argument that the CRRA resale royalty right is only an indirect re-
straint on alienation, one permitting alienation but “reducing the
amount the owner might otherwise realize on a sale of the prop-
erty.”197 The Third Restatement of Property would uphold such restric-
tions unless irrational, but many courts have stuck with the more
demanding standard of reasonableness.198
But even assuming the resale royalty right qualifies as a restraint on
alienation, the question remains whether it is a reasonable restraint.
The economic policies against restraints on alienation (transaction
costs, price discrimination, and leveraging intellectual property rights
into another market) in the Lexmark opinion would not seem to apply
with great force to the CRRA resale right. In a sense, transaction
costs would not be directly affected. Unlike other settings where it
would be necessary to negotiate with the rights-holders, the CRRA
freely permits resales. So there would not be transaction costs in the
sense of Lexmark—those “remoras” sticking to the item as it flows
through the market199—where it might be necessary to negotiate with
a rights-holder before selling the property—or to negotiate with many
rights-holders before selling some property. The 5% resale royalty,
however, could be seen as a transaction cost in more general terms,
similar to a tax. If sellers must pay 5% of sales to artists, then there
could be fewer sales of fine art—or at any rate fewer sales of fine art
in California. But those sorts of transaction costs would not seem to
make the resale right “equivalent” to the copyright exclusive right of
public distribution. However, the existence of the 5% resale royalty
right could lead owners to sell the works in other states—outside the
195. Cf. Van Houweling, supra note 83.
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
197. Id. § 3.5 (“Many servitudes indirectly affect the alienability of property by lim-
iting the numbers of potential buyers or by reducing the amount the owner might
otherwise realize on a sale of the property. If the servitude is validly created under
Chapter 2, and is not otherwise invalid under the rules stated in this Chapter, the fact
that the servitude results in some diminution in return to the owner, or some reduc-
tion in the potential market for the property, is not sufficient justification for refusing
to give effect to the intent of the parties to create the servitude.”).
198. See generally SINGER, supra note 21, at 285 (“Provisions that require future
purchasers to pay a fee to the original grantor also may well be struck down as unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation.”).
199. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017).
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reach of CRRA—which could certainly entail more transaction costs,
in a broad sense.200
The fact that the 5% goes to the artist rather than the state does
tend to make the resale right a little more like the copyright holder’s
exclusive right of distribution. Although the artist does not have the
right to prevent others from distributing the work (as under copy-
right), the artist maintains leverage to demand 5% if the work is sold.
That does give the artist some control over distribution of authorized
copies.
With respect to price discrimination, that would hardly seem to be a
factor with the resale right. An artist might engage in price discrimina-
tion, perhaps by making works that were deemed as special for high-
end buyers and more mundane works for a lower price. The resale
right would hardly facilitate that. The statute could result in a mode of
price discrimination, whereby the artist arranged to sell works out of
state (or create them out of state) in order to avoid CRRA, which
might encourage some buyers to pay more. Likewise, the artist might
even create some works in categories not covered by CRRA, so that
buyers would not be subject to the resale royalty obligation. But that
would not allow the artist to profit from price discrimination in the
way that a seller who sells the same product to different buyers at
different prices can.
In that vein, a key distinction between the resale royalty right and
the restraints in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark is that the resale royalty right
applies to the original artwork, not copies.201 The restraint in Kirt-
saeng would have allowed the publisher to sell copies of the book at
one price in the United States and another price in other markets,
with no fear that books could move from one market to the other. The
restraint in Lexmark would have allowed the patent holder to control
the market for refurbished printer cartridges. The resale royalty right
applies not to an entire market of paintings, but to individual paint-
ings. Indeed, the entire question springs from the fact that the Copy-
right Act defines “copy” to include the original work.202 Unlike other
authors, painters do not make an original and then sell as many copies
as they can. Rather, they make the original and sell it, meaning any
appreciation in value goes to the subsequent owner, not the original
author. The resale royalty is a modest attempt to preserve some of
200. See DeBor, supra note 23, at 128–29 (discussing how implementation of resale
rights in Paris caused dealers to move sales to London).
201. First sale applies to the original and to copies, because the Copyright Act de-
fines “copy” to include the original. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“Copies” are material
objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
“copies” includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is
first fixed.”) (emphasis added).
202. Id.
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that value for the original artist.203 The ability of an artist to engage in
price discrimination, as in Kirtsaeng, is very limited. A painter could
sell his or her best work at a certain price, and also produce lower-
quality works for lower prices (or sell both paintings and sketches, or
sculptures and miniatures), but such practices would have limited
market effect, and could easily harm the reputation of the artist.
Likewise, the CRRA resale royalty right would not permit artists to
extend their rights in the artwork to other markets. In theory, a seller
could bundle a CRRA-protected artwork with other merchandise and
then apportion the price in a way to minimize the CRRA payment
due. But that would not give the seller any market power in the mar-
ket for the second item. Rather, it would simply be a matter of CRRA
compliance. So it could be lumped into a broad conception of “trans-
action costs,” in the sense of costs that might be incurred to avoid the
CRRA obligations.
Looking to the policy of courts in restraint on alienation cases, the
resale royalty again seems less like a restraint on alienation. Courts
are concerned with whether the prohibition has real force as prevent-
ing further transfers of the property. A 5% resale royalty right would
provide a little friction, but relatively small. Read broadly, Close
would conflict with the sales tax effective in most states. In many
states, if an artwork is sold, the seller is obliged to remit a percentage
to the state or local authorities. Sales taxes often exceed 5%.204 It
seems unlikely that courts would hold that the federal copyright and
patent statutes preempt the various state sales taxes. So the restraint
on alienation must somehow rest upon the fact that the 5% is owed
not to the state, but rather to the artist.
If the resale royalty is deemed a restraint on alienation, albeit a
rather mild one, the question then becomes how that fits into the pre-
emption analysis. Lexmark and Kirtsaeng did not concern preemption
but rather the extent of first sale itself. Those cases considered the
policy of restraints on alienation as being an underlying policy of first
sale. In the preemption analysis, a court could consider again restraint
on alienation as the policy behind first sale, but then use that for a
different question: whether the state law at issue is equivalent to, or
conflicts with, federal copyright’s right of public distribution, as lim-
203. See Shipley, supra note 146, at 6 (“Over time, as an artist’s reputation grows
and his or her works appreciate in value, the person who stands to gain from subse-
quent sales of those appreciated paintings and sculptural works is the collector, not
the visual artist who created the work. Resale royalty laws address this disparity in
how copyright law protects and rewards visual artists compared to authors, composers
and other creators. Hence, droit de suite can be justified as compensation for the lack
of a marketable reproduction right for many works of fine art.”).
204. For example, the sales tax in Cook County, Illinois, for General Merchandise
is 6.25%. See What is the Sales Tax Rate in Illinois?, ILL. REVENUE, https://www2.illi
nois.gov/rev/questionsandanswers/Pages/139.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/V52Y-CUWR].
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ited by the first sale doctrine.205 Lexmark and Kirtsaeng interpreted
the first sale doctrine broadly, in order to limit the restraints on alien-
ation in those cases.206 That does not mean that the cases stand for the
proposition that all restraints on alienation are contrary to the first
sale doctrine, and so should be preempted. That would be true only if,
under Lexmark, all restraints on alienation were subject to the first
sale doctrine. But such a broad preemptive effect of the Copyright
Act would disturb commercial practices immensely. Using property as
collateral is, in the very broad sense, a restraint on alienation, because
the debtor cannot now sell the property free and clear of the security
interest, without paying off the creditor.207 Leases are inherently re-
straints on alienation where property is delivered but the possessor
has only the rights under the lease, and cannot further transfer the
property away. Many other examples come to mind readily.
In addition, if state legislation is the guide, then California’s act in
legislating the resale royalty act would seem to support its reasonable-
ness. Lastly, we must acknowledge the irony that a state statute would
be preempted under state law on the theory that the rule provided by
the state law was unreasonable under state law. A resale royalty right
is much less restrictive, for example, than a due-on-sale clause. Such a
clause provides that if collateral is sold before the loan is paid off, the
entire amount of the loan becomes due.208
The resale royalty right is quite distinguishable from the resale price
minimum set by the publisher in Bobbs-Merrill. First, the resale right
is 5% of sales, so the owner is free to sell at whatever price she
chooses. A resale minimum, by contrast, prevents any sale below the
copyright owner’s chosen price, which leaves control of the market for
the item in the hands of the copyright owner. Second, the 5% royalty
is set by the state for all artworks. That means that the copyright
owner exercises no control, and also means that, because other works
205. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(applying patent preemption); 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (providing for copyright pre-
emption of state law).
206. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536–37
(2017); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013).
207. See U.C.C. §§ 9-610, 615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1998).
208. See, e.g., Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Venco P’ship, 293 N.W.2d 843, 844
(Neb. 1980) (“While ‘due on sale’ clauses take a number of forms, essentially they are,
in form, similar to the clause involved in the instant case, which provided ‘[I]n the
event of a sale of said premises without the written approval of said [lender], then the
whole indebtedness hereby secured shall, at the option of said [lender], immediately
become due and collectible without further notice, and this mortgage may then be
foreclosed to recover the amount due on said note or obligation . . . .’”). However, the
court in that case did not hold the due on sale clause to be invalid: “We must find, as a
matter of law, that ‘due on sale’ clauses are neither direct nor indirect restraints on
alienation and, therefore, are not void as such.” Id. at 848.
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are subject to the same 5% resale royalty, sellers in that market will
not be at a competitive disadvantage.209
One could argue that the resale royalty is similar to a private trans-
fer fee, which commentators have argued would be an unreasonable
restraint on alienation.210 There are also distinctions to be made be-
tween the resale royalty right and the private transfer fee. One could
argue that the resale right is a little like the fee to a homeowner’s
association rather than a pure private fee to the original developer.
The argument that the right facilitates the creation of works and their
original sale is much stronger. A developer presumably will seek to
sell the property at a market rate, perhaps discounted by the future
transfer obligation. The developer then shares in the general real es-
tate market’s rise in price (if any). An artist likewise may sell at a
market rate, but a much different sort of market. The new, unknown
artist will likely get low prices and could reasonably hold on to the
artworks in the hope that in the future their price will increase, inde-
pendent of the increase in the price of art generally. The payments to
the artist help the artist continue his career producing more art in his
oeuvre. In short, the public policy of encouraging artists at the begin-
ning of their careers seems stronger than the likelihood that private
transfer fees will realistically make real estate development and sales
less pricey.
The resale royalty right is closer to the sort of restraints on aliena-
tion that courts have upheld as reasonable. The right does not prevent
alienation but rather imposes a 5% fee on resale. The fee itself does
not obstruct resale in the way that a right of refusal or option to repur-
chase at a below market rate would. Rather, the fee depends on there
being a sale at the market rate. The right also serves a purpose aligned
with copyright, providing an incentive to creators. In the same vein,
the right is analogous to purposes underlying restraints that have been
held valid, because it serves to protect the interests of artists who may
sell their work early in their career. The artist is far from the rights-
holders in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark, who sought to leverage their rights
into control over a separate market.211 Finally, the resale royalty right
209. The contrary view would be that any restriction on resale is contrary to first
sale. See Shipley, supra note 146, at 22 (“Subsequent rulings have said that this free-
dom includes the right to resell the goods for whatever price the buyer deems appro-
priate, without regard to the wishes of the copyright holder. The law is at odds with
these principles because it gives California artists an advantage not enjoyed by other
artists, and it disadvantages California art dealers against those outside the state. Cop-
yright owners cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in downstream markets.”).
210. Amy Kathleen Lewis, Comment, Developing Disaster: How Developers Are
Using a Covenant to Steal from Homeowners and Why the States Should Stop Them,
64 OKLA. L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2012).
211. Shipley, supra note 146, at 27. Because a 5% royalty is minimal control as
compared to the 100% prohibitions in Kirtsaeng and Lexmark, those cases are distin-
guishable. For the view that the resale royalty is sufficient control to conflict with first
sale, see id. (“In addition, as discussed in connection with conflict preemption under
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was not a product of a rights holder including restrictive language in a
contract. Rather, it was a statute enacted by the state of California for
policy reasons. The common law rule against unreasonable restraints
on alienation is largely state law.212 It would be difficult to say that
under California property law, the resale royalty statute itself was an
unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The fact that the resale royalty is a general requirement under state
law rather than one created by a particular artist also would weigh in
favor of reasonableness. As noted above, it indicates that the state
deemed the policy reasonable, and reasonableness of restraints on
property is a classic state law issue. In addition, the state-created na-
ture of the right greatly reduces a great problem with restraints on
personal property. If the transferor of real estate creates a restraint on
real property, it will generally be in the deed of transfer, which will be
recorded in the real estate records, putting future transferees on no-
tice.213 But the transfer of personal property generally does not re-
quire recording of an instrument (with such exceptions as automobile
titles or UCC filings to perfect a security interest in personal prop-
erty).214 Future transferees of personal property may not be on no-
tice.215 In addition, if restraints were generally permitted, potential
transferees might expend considerable research before acquiring
property to check if it was subject to restraints, increasing transaction
costs. But a state-created resale royalty right for artwork does not suf-
fer from such a notice problem. Merchants in the California art mar-
ket should be readily aware of such a requirement, just as they would
be expected to know of any applicable sales tax. The resale royalty
right, even if it barely qualifies as restraint on alienation, should be
deemed reasonable and so not run afoul of the first sale doctrine.
IV. “LICENSES” TO AVOID FIRST SALE, AS RESTRAINTS
ON ALIENATION
The first sale doctrine permits the owner of a piece of property to
sell it, even if the property embodies a copyrighted work or a patented
invention. Copyright and patent owners in some industries have at-
tempted to distribute products while avoiding first sale rights in order
the Supremacy Clause, recent Supreme Court decisions hold that the first sale doc-
trine as codified in section 109(a), not only governs, but also forbids, efforts to control
downstream sales.”) (footnote omitted).
212. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 21, at 278–83 (discussing common law develop-
ment using cases applying state law).
213. See, e.g., id. at 528–54 (discussing deeds and recording statutes).
214. See U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1998) (“Subject
to these provisions and to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Arti-
cle 9), title to goods passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any
conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.”).
215. See generally Peter Menell & Michael Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Ex-
ternalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
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to control the secondary market for the product. Software transac-
tions are often characterized as licenses, rather than sales, in order to
avoid first sale. A software company will, for a price, deliver a copy of
software.216 The contract will provide that the copy of software re-
mains the property of the software maker and is delivered subject to
the terms of a license.217 The license allows the purchaser to possess
and use the software but imposes restrictions.218 Most importantly, the
purchaser will not have the right to resell the software.219 Courts have
enforced the parties’ agreements according to their terms, meaning
that those copies are not subject to first sale. This Section reexamines
this reasoning in the light of Kirtsaeng and Lexmark.
A. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. and its Aftermath
The leading case discussing the difference between software licens-
ing and sales is Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.220 Vernor bought copies of
AutoCAD software—sophisticated computer-aided design software—
from parties that had acquired the software from Autodesk.221 Vernor
resold the software on eBay.222 The question was whether first sale
authorized him to resell the software, or whether he was infringing
Autodesk’s right to distribute copies of its copyrighted work to the
public. Autodesk distributed the software under a licensing agree-
ment, which provided among other things that the copy of the
software remained the property of Autodesk and could not be
resold.223
The Vernor court, drawing from earlier cases, formulated a three-
part analysis: “First, we consider whether the copyright owner speci-
fies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the
copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the
software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes
notable use restrictions.”224 Under this approach, the court held the
transaction to be merely a license, not a sale. First, the agreement was
216. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2010).
217. Id. (“The SLA for Release 14 first recites that Autodesk retains title to all
copies. Second, it states that the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable
license to use Release 14. Third, it imposes transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers
from renting, leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s prior consent
and from electronically or physically transferring the software out of the Western
Hemisphere. Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions.”).
218. Id.
219. Id. (“Third, it imposes transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from rent-
ing, leasing, or transferring the software without Autodesk’s prior consent and from
electronically or physically transferring the software out of the Western
Hemisphere.”).
220. See id.
221. Id. at 1105.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1104.
224. Id. at 1110–11.
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clearly labelled a license, as opposed to a sale.225 Second, in the
court’s view, there were significant restrictions on transfer: transfer
was prohibited.226 Third, the court held there were notable use restric-
tions: “The SLA also imposed use restrictions against the use of the
software outside the Western Hemisphere and against modifying,
translating, or reverse-engineering the software, removing any propri-
etary marks from the software or documentation, or defeating any
copy protection.”227 Accordingly, because Autodesk reserved title in
the parties’ agreement, the court held that its customers were mere
licensees who did not become owners of the software, meaning that
Vernor did not become an owner of an authorized copy of the
software, and first sale did not authorize resale by Vernor.228
Other courts have followed Vernor.229 Indeed, courts have enforced
such terms so enthusiastically that only extreme attempts by copyright
holders to condition transfer of copies have been invalidated. In UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,230 the restrictions on further transfer
were not in a browsewrap or clickwrap agreement, or even obtained
for consideration. Rather, a music publisher gave away promotion
CDs of music, bearing the following “promotional statement”:
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to
the intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD
shall constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the li-
cense. Resale or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be
punishable under federal and state laws.231
Unlike Vernor, the Augusto court held the restriction did not prevent
the passing of title to the recipients.232 Accordingly, as owners of au-
thorized copies, they were entitled to sell them under first sale.233 Au-
225. Id. at 1111.
226. Id. (“Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed significant transfer
restrictions: it stated that the license is nontransferable, the software could not be
transferred or leased without Autodesk’s written consent, and the software could not
be transferred outside the Western Hemisphere.”).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1111–12 (“Thus, because Autodesk reserved title to Release 14 copies
and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions, we conclude that its customers
are licensees of their copies of Release 14 rather than owners. Both CTA’s and Ver-
nor’s sales infringed Autodesk’s exclusive right to distribute copies of its work.”).
229. Stephen McIntyre, Game Over for First Sale, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 18
(2014) (citing cases) (“The Ninth Circuit has been especially prolific in articulating
how copyright owners can avoid the pitfall of actually selling goods to their
customers.”).
230. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011).
231. Id. at 1177–78.
232. Id. at 1183.
233. Id. at 1180 (“We conclude that, under all the circumstances of the CDs’ distri-
bution, the recipients were entitled to use or dispose of them in any manner they saw
fit, and UMG did not enter a license agreement for the CDs with the recipients. Ac-
cordingly, UMG transferred title to the particular copies of its promotional CDs and
cannot maintain an infringement action against Augusto for his subsequent sale of
those copies.”).
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gusto, however, did not question the enforceability of clauses that
limit transfer of title and restrict further transfer.234 Rather, Augusto
simply held that the recipients had not agreed to such clauses,235 in
contrast to software cases, where the users had ordered and paid for
the software and agreed to the terms.236
B. Application of Vernor in Restraints on Alienation Context
The Vernor decision gives effect to the agreement between the par-
ties and cannot be faulted as a matter of contract law.237 Kirtsaeng and
Lexmark, however, provide that federal copyright law will override
inconsistent contract law in order to prevent contractual restraints on
alienation from interfering with the first sale doctrine.238 Now that the
policy against restraints on alienation is the key to first sale, Vernor’s
framework bears reexamination. The three-part test gives effect to the
parties’ agreement, but would be inapt under restraint against aliena-
tion scrutiny.
The first step, whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is
granted a license, would be of no weight. Unreasonable restraints on
alienation are not enforceable, regardless of how the parties charac-
terize them. Indeed, a contract will rarely have a clause entitled “re-
straint on alienation.” Rather, courts will look through the legal form
the parties choose, rather looking to the substance of the transaction.
Looking at form over substance is consistent with commercial transac-
tion law generally. Software transactions like the one in Vernor are
generally considered subject to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2
on the sale of goods. To give effect to the sale, the UCC overrides
contractual reservations of title if in effect a sale is what the parties
enter into: “Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in
effect to a reservation of a security interest.”239 A security interest
would be of no significance in cases where the software had been fully
paid for, and so there was no debt to secure.240
234. Id. (“Particularly with regard to computer software, we have recognized that
copyright owners may create licensing arrangements so that users acquire only a li-
cense to use the particular copy of software and do not acquire title that permits
further transfer or sale of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner.”).
235. Id. at 1182 (“Because the record here is devoid of any indication that the re-
cipients agreed to a license, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that licenses
were established under the terms of the promotional statement.”).
236. Id. at 1181.
237. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 2010).
238. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532–35 (2017);
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013).
239. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1998).
240. See U.C.C. § 9-513(b)(1) (Debtor may require filing of termination statement
relating to security interest if “there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered
by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obliga-
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An argument has been made that software licenses are indeed se-
curity interests. Where a software license transfers copies of software
but purports to retain ownership of the copies, one could recharacter-
ize the transaction as transferring ownership of the software subject to
a security interest.241 Even if the transaction is not a sale on credit, so
there is no money debt to be secured by the software, one could argue
that the software is collateral to secure the obligations of the buyer to
comply with the license.242 If the buyer breaches, then the software
could be repossessed. The license will contain an agreement not to
transfer the software to anyone else: reselling the software would con-
stitute a breach and trigger the right to repossess the software.
That argument would not survive after Lexmark. The Court held
that contractual restraints on alienation would be overridden by the
federal first sale doctrine.243 The security interest argument does noth-
ing more than provide a means for contract law (granting of a security
interest) to give effect to a property right to restrain alienation. A
security interest gives a right to repossess collateral if a debt is not
paid, and becomes nugatory once the debt is paid.244 The security in-
terest view of anti-transfer clauses, by contrast, would apply where
there is no debt, would last permanently, and would serve no purpose
other than to prevent transfer of the software. It would allow software
sellers to negate first sale with a one-line clause in the sales contract,
exactly what Lexmark held ineffective. And it would not be limited to
software, so sellers of books, music, paintings, and every other type of
copyrighted work could benefit. First sale would become an option at
the choice of copyright holders, whereas Lexmark quite clearly made
first sale a restriction on patent holders, with reasoning relying on and
applicable to copyright.245
When we look at how such a security interest would play out, its
effect as a restraint on alienation becomes quite clear. Suppose that
the retention of title was treated as the retention of a security interest
and that the contract contained an anti-transfer clause. If the software
tion, or otherwise give value.”). The security interest could be significant if, as dis-
cussed in the next paragraph, it secured a contingent obligation.
241. See John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1, 72 (2016) (“A court ruling in Vernor’s
favor on the first sale doctrine would have had to view the software copies as physical
goods that can be bought and sold. That viewpoint would trigger application of the
UCC, and a court applying the UCC would almost certainly have to rule that, if
Autodesk’s transfer of the software-on-a-disk is viewed as a sale, it would be a sale
subject to Autodesk’s retention of a security interest securing the obligations in the
purported license.”).
242. Id.
243. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532–35 (2017).
244. See U.C.C. §§ 9-610, 615 (giving creditor right to take possession of collateral
upon default and right to apply the proceeds of sale of collateral to the payment of
the secured debt).
245. See Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1532–35.
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was resold, that would trigger a default, permitting the original seller
to repossess the software. What next? The original seller could not
simply keep the repossessed software. The UCC permits a repossess-
ing creditor only to resell the collateral with prior notice.246 The re-
possessing creditor is not permitted to simply keep the repossessed
collateral, even if that was specifically allowed in the contract; the
UCC negates such a contract right of “strict foreclosure.”247 Rather,
the repossessing seller would have to resell the software in a commer-
cially reasonable manner—in other words, in the same way software
vendors sell such software.248 The security interest, in effect, would
simply amount to the original seller being entitled to monopolize the
resale market, to the exclusion of owners of authorized copies, exactly
what the first sale doctrine prohibits, as reflected in Kirtsaeng and
Lexmark.249
The question also arises, what would the creditor do with the money
from reselling the software? It would be entitled to apply the money
to the debt, and then return any surplus to the debtor—the person
who had bought the software on resale (such as Vernor). So the result
would be that the second buyer (such as Vernor) would have its prop-
erty repossessed and sold to pay the obligation of the first buyer (who
resold to Vernor). Lexmark allows parties to use contract law to agree
between themselves about whether transfer is permissible, but does
not allow those contractual agreements to be binding on third parties
as a matter of patent infringement.250 But that would be the effect, if
the transferred property, although no longer owned by a party to the
agreement, could be collateral for any breach of the agreement. The
measure of the debt would presumably be the damages from the
breach of the anti-transfer clause—which raises the question of how to
measure damages (or assess the reasonableness of a liquidated dam-
ages provision), where the only damage flows from reselling the prop-
erty, something that a non-party to the agreement should be required
to do.
To take things a little more broadly, accepting the security interest
argument would open the door to restraints on alienation generally.
As long as the restraint was included in a security agreement (for per-
sonal property) or mortgage (for real estate), then it could effectively
bar any further alienation of the property. But courts have long struck
246. See U.C.C. § 9-620 (permitting the creditor only to propose keeping the collat-
eral in satisfaction of the debt, which debtor may reject).
247. U.C.C. § 9-620.
248. See U.C.C. § 9-610.
249. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1532–33
(2017); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013).
250. See Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1533 (“Once sold, the Return Program cartridges
passed outside of the patent monopoly, and whatever rights Lexmark retained are a
matter of the contracts with its purchasers, not the patent law.”).
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down restraints on alienation that were included in documents filed in
the real estate records, whether deeds or mortgages.251
The second factor in the Vernor test is whether the copyright owner
significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software.252 In
contract law, this would be rightly considered in determining what
rights were transferred. But in considering whether the transaction is
an unreasonable restraint on alienation, the factor would cut in the
other direction. The test is equivalent to asking: To what extent has
the transferor imposed a restraint on alienation?
The third factor under Vernor is whether the copyright owner im-
posed notable use restrictions.253 This factor, unlike the other two,
would remain relevant, in determining whether the transaction con-
veyed ownership, in substance. If a product were transferred under
strict limitations on use, then it might not qualify as a transfer of own-
ership because the recipient did not effectively become the owner of
the goods, but rather was merely a lessee or bailee of goods still be-
longing to the transferor. But that would take more than the sort of
restrictions in Vernor and other typical software transactions.
Autodesk’s agreement prevented its customers from “modifying,
translating, or reverse-engineering the software, removing any propri-
etary marks from the software or documentation, or defeating any
copy protection.”254 Such provisions do little more than restate rights
that would accompany any sale of a copyrighted work, first sale not-
withstanding. Copyright gives the copyright owner a set of exclusive
rights: in short, (1) to make copies; (2) to adapt the work; (3) to dis-
tribute copies; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and (5)
to display copies to the public.255 First sale insulates the owner of a
copy from two of those rights. She may distribute that copy or display
that copy. But first sale does not authorize her to make copies of her
copy, adapt it, or perform it in public. So first sale would not permit
Vernor to modify, translate, or reverse-engineer the software.256 Re-
moving proprietary marks or defeating copy protection would like-
wise be barred by the anti-circumvention and copyright-information
protections of the Copyright Act.257 Putting those sorts of restrictions
into the contract does not detract from the transfer of the software
being a sale of that particular copy.
The agreement in Vernor is a sale of the software with a restraint on
alienation. Whether first sale overrides that restraint should still de-
251. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 21, at 278–79 (discussing how courts strike down
disabling restraints on alienation included in deeds).
252. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
256. Fair use might apply to some activity in those areas, especially if not for com-
mercial purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2018).
257. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2018).
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pend on whether the restraint was a reasonable restraint. Autodesk
made a number of policy arguments against applying first sale, which
could also be considered on the question of reasonableness:
Autodesk contends that this (1) allows for tiered pricing for differ-
ent software markets, such as reduced pricing for students or educa-
tional institutions; (2) increases software companies’ sales; (3)
lowers prices for all consumers by spreading costs among a large
number of purchasers; and (4) reduces the incidence of piracy by
allowing copyright owners to bring infringement actions against un-
authorized resellers.258
These are not the sort of justifications that courts have held would
make restraints on alienations reasonable. Indeed, the first is simply
an argument for permitting price discrimination (“tiered pricing for
different software markets”), whereas first sale is intended to hinder
price discrimination.259 The next two are possible, indirect effects of
price discrimination (it allows the seller to make more sales by pricing
differently). Lowering costs for all consumers would actually not be a
goal of Autodesk, who would like to use price discrimination to
charge each buyer the most they would pay, and so would only be an
effect of imperfect price discrimination from lack of perfect informa-
tion about the entire range of consumers.260 Reducing piracy is circu-
lar in this context. Parties reselling authorized copies under first sale
are pirates only from the point of view of the frustrated copyright
owner.
After the policy demarcation of Lexmark and Kirtsaeng, the trend
in case law may reverse, after reexamining under the lens of restraints
on alienation, rather than simply contract law. The sellers of software
(and works like movies and books, which also sometimes seek to pre-
vent resale) would not be able to unilaterally opt out of the first sale
doctrine. Rather, although restraints on resale may be effective be-
tween the parties as a matter of contract law, they would not make
non-parties that later purchase and resell those goods liable for
infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Lexmark and Kirtsaeng, rooted first sale in
the policy against restraints on alienation in rather absolute terms.
Those cases involved rather absolute restraints on alienation, so the
258. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114–15.
259. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 552 (2013) (“To the con-
trary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the “first sale” doctrine) limits
copyright holders’ ability to divide domestic markets.”).
260. Cf. id. at 539 (“With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance of
leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise
disposing of those goods. American law too has generally thought that competition,
including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of the consumer.”).
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lack of subtlety was not out of place. But other restraints on alienation
in the context of intellectual property are less clearly drawn. A
nuanced application of the policy could change the prevailing law re-
garding (1) the extent of judicially created conflict preemption and (2)
the extent to which federal first sale preempts state laws that have the
effect of restraining alienation of property covered by patents or copy-
rights. Despite the visceral rejection that restraints on alienation seem
to trigger in judges, some can serve purposes to benefit both parties to
the original transaction and their successors, as opposed to simply ty-
ing the hands of future owners. After Lexmark and Kirtsaeng, the
courts should change positions on two first-sale-related issues. First,
first sale should not preempt statutes like California’s Resale Royalty
Act, which create only minor friction on alienation while serving a
purpose completely in accord with federal copyright law. Second,
courts should reverse the trend of treating software transactions as
mere licenses. Rather, courts should acknowledge that where the
seller delivers the software and the buyer is entitled to keep and use it
freely, a sale has occurred. That sale triggers the right under first sale
to resell the software, contractual restraints on alienation notwith-
standing. Patent and copyright can learn much from the varied case
law experience of common law property.
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